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ABSTRACT
This article explores the differences, similarities, comparative advantages and
disadvantages between developer funding requirements for Affordable and Work
Force Housing in the United States and Spain. Emphasis is placed on impact fees
as a revenue source in the United States and value recapture requirements in
Spain and in Catalonia in particular. The author concludes that American impact
fees provide a broader base for developer funding requirement but that Spanish
land value recapture programs offer greater flexibi lity to planning officials when
they are applicable.
Key words: Affordable housing;Work Force Housing; Impact Fees;Land Value
Recapture;Developer Infrastructure Funding Requirements

I.

An Introduction to the Funding of Affordable and Work Force
Housing in the USA and Spain

1
Professor and Ben F. Johnson, Jr. Chair in Law, Director of the Center for the Comparative
Study of Metropolitan Growth, Georgia State University; A.B. & J.D .. Duke University.
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The need for affordable housing in all countries is not in doubt2 and data
as well as personal observation strongly supports that need in the United States
and Spain. The need is not debated. 3 The debate in both countries is how
affordable housing can and should be financed. The purpose of this article is to
focus on potential funding of affordable housing through financial obligations
placed on developers in the development approval process of the two countries.
Although such programs often are and frequently need to be combined with
public financing of various types, an examination of such programs is left to the
works of other authors included in this collection.

II.

An American View

A.

Developer Funding Programs in Gener al

How can developers be required to provide or finance affordable
housing? Developer funding or provision of infrastructure as a condition which
must be met in order to obtain development permission has a long history in the
United States stretching back nearly a century and first appeared in the fom1 of
4
required dedications for plat approval in subdivision regulation law. Required
dedications are still used in affordable housing programs in the form of set asides
and inclusionary requirements - or inclusionary zoning, as it is often labeled. 5
For example, a commonly encountered approach to developer funding of
affordable housing is to require a residential developer, for example, to set aside
land within his development for the construction of affordable units and even to
include construction of such units on site and sell' or rent them at below free
market value.
Required dedications which first related only to infrastructure within
subdivisions have evolved into impact fees or development fees as they are
labeled in some jurisdictions. In one form or another, impact fees now exist in
2

Juli Ponce, "Affordable Housing and Social Mix: Comparative Approach, vol.2, #1 Journal of
Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction 31 (Feb. I, 20 I 0).
3
Several of the articles published as part of this Study Space publication explore these issues in
detail and the reader is referred to them.
4
Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
LAW 436 (3d ed. 2012).
5
Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
LAW 381 (3d ed. 2012). For a comparison of the Spanish approach with American inclusionary
zoning, see Juli Ponce, "Affordable Housing and Social Mix: Comparative Approach, vol.2, # 1
Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in E ngineering and Constniction 31, 37 (Feb. 1,
2010).
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nearly all states and are a common technique used to generate revenue for capital
funding necessitated by new development. To date, approximately 27 states
have enacted impact fee enabling legislation6 and in most other states impact fees
are enacted pursuant to home rule powers or pursuant to individual local
government enablement. Impact fees are charges levied by local governments on
new developments in order to pay a proportionate share of the capital costs of
providing public infrastructure to those developments.
In the Georgia
Development Impact Fee Act, a leading impact fee enabling statute, an "impact
fee" is defined as "a payment of money imposed upon development as a
condition of development approval to pay for a proportionate share of the cost of
system improvements needed to serve new growth and development." 7 Impact
fees play an increasingly important role in the efforts of local governments to
cope with the economic burdens of population growth such as the need for new
parks, roads, schools, jails, public buildings, libraries, sewer, water treatment and
stonn water facilities, and public safety buildings and equipment.8
The essential legal principle that governs the validity of impact fees is
the rational nexus test. Since impact fees are enacted pursuant to a governmental
unit's land use control power it is police power based and consequently must
satisfy a reasonableness test. This test for the validity of impact fees is usually
expressed as the dual rational nexus test. Simply stated, the rational nexus test,
i.e., the dual rational nexus test, has two components: (I) Impact fees may be no
more than the government's infrastructure costs which are reasonably
attributable to the new development, i.e. that development's proportionate share,
and (2) The new development required to pay impact fees must benefit from the
expenditure of those fees.9
Considerable attention has been given in many American jurisdictions to
giving modest subsidies to affordable housing by providing certain exemptions
or special treatment from impact fees for infrastructure items such as roads,
parks, and public building for affordable housing projects. 10 Being exempted
6

See Arthur C. Nelson, James C. Nicholas & Julian C. Juergensmeyer, Impact Fees: Principles
and Practice of Proportionate Share Development Fees Ch. 4 (2009).
7
Georgia Development Impact Fee Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-2(8). System improvements,
also called non-site related improvements, are to be distinguished from project improvements,
also called site related improvements.
s Juergensmeyer & Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
LAW 532 (3d ed. 2012).
9
Id at 549.
10
Nelson, Bowles, Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY (2008).
Rcvi.ut1 di Derecho Urbanislico )' J\fedio Ambicllle
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from all or a portion of the impact fees that the affordable housing project would
otherwise have to pay decreases their construction cost. Such subsidies are
generally rather minor and therefore the more important question is whether
there can be impact fee programs designed to fund affordable housing. Without
doubt, impact fees are a possible funding source for the construction of
affordable housing even though the vast majority of impact fee programs found
in the United States at the present time focus on so-called "hard infrastructure"
for example, roads, parks, schools, public buildings, libraries, and public safety
facilities. The seminal case in this regard is I-Iolmdel Builders Ass 'n v. Township
of Holmdel, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the imposition of
fees on commercial and non-inclusionary residential developments for the
construction of low income housing. 11 The court examined two substantive
issues l.) If there was statutory authority under the municipality's police power
to impose affordable housing development fees as a condition for development
approval and 2.) If affordable housing development fees are an unconstitutional
form of taxation.
The Holmdel Township ordinance imposed a mandatory development
fee on all new commercial and residential development as a condition for
receiving a certificate of occupancy with the funds collected dedicated to an
affordable housing trust fund . In exchange, the development received a density
bonus. 12
The ordinance linked community-housing goals with real estate
development to address the lower income-housing crisis. Linkage strategies
relate the housing and infrastructure needs created by new development to a
requirement that the entity generating the need provide· the resources to pay for
the impacts of the development. The Court found that providing lower income
housing is one of the purposes of police power eligible zoning authority
incorporated by reference into New Jersey's Zoning and Enabling Act. 13 The
"real and substantial" relationship between development fee measures affects
"the nature and extent of the uses of land and buildings and structures thereon"
and is not an impennissible exaction. In overturning the Appellate Division's
opinion, the Court found that affordable housing development fee ordinances
must bear a reasonable relationship, not a "stringent nexus", between commercial
construction and the need for affordable housing; ultimately concluding that the
dual rational nexus test is too stringent to be appropriate in determining the
relationship between development fees and affordable housing.

II

12

13

121 N.J. 550, 583 2d 277 (1990).
121 N.J. 550, 559 (1990).
121 N.J. 550, 567 (1990).
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In regard to constitutionality, New Jersey's Fair Housing Act (FHA)
does not expressly authorize a municipality to impose development fees. The
statute's language does confer broad powers on a municipality - including
authority "to provide for its share of low and moderate income housing by means
of any technique or combination of techniques which provide a realistic
oppo1tunity for the provision of its fair share". In interpreting the FHA's
language, the Court deemed authority to require development fees to be
supported by the FHA while leaving open the question if development fees must
14
always be compensated with density bonuses. The decision lends authority to
the proposition that affordable housing development fee ordinances are
permissible land use regulations and not excessive and unconstitutional exactions
but the Court's indication that a less strict standard of review than the dual
rational nexus test applies is not necessarily a position that should be expected
from courts in other jurisdictions.
The California Supreme Court recently held in Sterling Park, L.P. v.
City of Palo Alto that an affordable housing requirement of ten out of 96
residential units and a payment of a fee of approximately 5% of the sales value of
the market rate units both constituted exactions rather than land use regulations. 15
Without deciding if the imposed requirements were constitutional, the decision
placed future affordable housing requirements under a higher scrutiny by
requiring municipalities to demonstrate a nexus and rough proportionality
between the affordable housing requirement and the impact it is intended to
address. 16 The California Supreme Court has granted review to address the
applicable standard for affordable housing requirements in California Building
17
lndust1y Ass'n v. City of San Jose. The City of San Jose adopted an affordable
housing ordinance requiring a fraction of all new development to be dedicated to
low to moderate income housing. 18 The California Building Industry
Association challenged the decision, arguing the city fai led to show a
"reasonable relationship" between the requirements and a public need for
affordable housing. 19 In upholding the ordinance, the Appellate Court found the
ordinance to be a land use regulation rather than an exaction and thus reviewable

14

12 1N.J. 550, 575 (1990).
Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Allo, 57 Cal. 4th 1193, 1207 (20 13).
16
Id. at 1205
17
California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013) review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of
San Jose, 307 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2013)
18
Id. at 816.
19
Id. at 817
15
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as an exercise of police power rather than the strict scrutiny applicable to
exactions. 20
Even though the Holmdel program and the California programs just
discussed focused on funding the construction of "affordable housing," there
may be advantages under American law to make a distinction between affordable
housing and work force housing.

B.

Workforce Housing vs. Affordable Housing

Despite frequently being used interchangeably, affordable housing and
workforce housing have different meanings. Fundamentally, workforce housing
is a subset of affordable housing that ties moderately priced housing to a
community's middle and lower middle income working citizens. Politically, due
to its association with middle rather than low income households, workforce
housing is a more palatable fonn of affordable housing in high income
communities where low income housing is associated with socioeconomic class
bias. Legally, inclusionary zoning encompasses workforce housing, with many
municipal ordinances requiring linkage fees to spur workforce housing
?I
development.Affordable housing fees are often referred to as "linkage fees" on the
theory that because of their social importance they should be entitled to less
stringent scrutiny from courts. As discussed above, the Holmdel 22court took this
position. In most jurisdictions, however, they are considered a form of exaction
and thus subject to the "essential nexus" takings test·of Nol/an. 23 Where there is
no evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem an exaction
24
seeks to address, the exaction may not be upheld. In finding a constitutional
20

Id. at 824. See also Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App.
4th 188, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 20800, 22 A.LR.6th 785 (1st Dist. 2001), as
modified, (July 2, 2001), cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 1356 (2002) (Nollan and Dolan held not
applicable to inclusionary zoning ordinance which was generally applicable to all development
in the city.).
21
Matthew J. Parlow, Whither Workforce Housing?, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1645, 1659 (2013).
It is interesting to note that in France there can be made a distinction between work force
housing and affordable housing, because since 1943 there is a mechanism for funding housing
for the work force paid by companies called "participation des employeurs a l'effort de
construction" also known as "1% logement". Further information can be obtained at
http://fr. \\i kipedia.oru/wikiiParticipation des ernploveurs

a l'effort

de construction.

22

121N.J.550, 583 2d 277 (1990).
23
Commercial Builders of N. California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.
1991)
24 Id.
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essential nexus existed, the Ninth Circuit Commercial Builders court examined a
study produced by the city connecting the exactions required of the developer
with the need for low income housing and the effect of nonresidential
development on the demand for such housing." 5
While courts have disagreed over applying strict scrutiny to workforce
housing ordinances, they have consistently required a reasonable relationship
between the fee assessed and the housing need generated directly by the
26
development. Thorough and detailed studies of workforce jobs required and
generated by the proposed commercial development, calculating precise fees,
and exchanging density bonus or other benefits offer a direct route to establishing
an essential nexus. 27
The major legal hurdle confronted in the defense of an affordable
housing impact fee is of course satisfying the dual rational nexus test - i.e.
establishing that the proposed development will create a need for and be
benefitted by affordable housing. Since not all courts will be willing to relax the
dual rational nexus test as did the New Jersey Supreme court, it would seem that
concentrating on work force housing will be more likely to pass judicial scrutiny.
An innovative developer fund ing based workforce housing program proposed for
but not yet adopted by a Florida local government will be used as a model for
discussion purposes. The dilemma faced by the City of Destin, Florida, a
prosperous and popular resort community is that housing costs have exceeded the
ability of the local workforce - construction workers, service personnel, public
school teachers, firemen , police men and paramedics to afford and therefore is
preventing them from living in the community. The Report prepared by Professor
James C. Nicholas, City of Destin Attainable Workforce Housing Study 28
explains this dilemma:
"Housing prices in Destin have risen to the point that there are concerns about
the ability of a substantial portion of the workforce to find adequate housing.
Although prices have abated, they are still matters of concern. Such an inability
could have serious implications for the Destin economy and for Destin's society.
The median price of the existing home in Destin now stands at $4 15,000, 75%

25

Id. at 873.
David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42/43 Urb. Law.
307, 316 (20 11)
27
Id. at 329.
28
City of Destin, Attainable Workforce Housing Study: Prepared for the City of Destin By
James C. Nicholas, Ph.D., August 2007.
26

Re1:ista di.• Dt•r~cho Urbanistico ,. Mi!dio Amhiente
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higher than the statewide average of $237,800 and 86% higher than the national
average of $223,000."
'The continuing development of Destin is a major factor leading to the increased
prices of Destin homes. Each new building adds to the need for construction
workers and then, after construction, to the need for employees that will operate
and maintain those structures. Many of the employees needed to serve Destin's
economic growth will not be able to afford adequate housing within Destin.
Labor shortages that may result will lessen the economic attractiveness of Destin
as a place for business location or expansion.
The construction and operation of residential and non-residential developments
will demand additional employees and those employees, in turn, will require
housing. The first impact is the actual construction of buildings. Destin
construction workers earn $33,073 and their households have $45,739, given
more than one wage-earner per household. A household with this income can
afford to pay $144,832 for housing. This income does not provide sufficient
resources for constrnction workforce households in Destin to afford market
housing in or around Destin.
Once residences are built they must be operated and maintained, thus creating the
need for continuing employees and their housing. The typical residential
operational and maintenance employee earns $39,271, with the household
income of that employee being $51,93 7. These employees can afford to pay
$164,457 for housing and thus will need housing assistance in order to afford
adequate workforce housing in Destin, which is priced at $165,873 for these
employees.
Therefore the data show that the construction, operation and
maintenance of residential structures do result in net unmet workforce housing
needs."
The report proceeds to establish a formulae for the workforce housing
needs created by commercial and residential development so as to assign the
workforce housing obligation which needs to be fulfilled as a prerequisite for the
granting of development permission. The fonnula takes into account the
difference in workforce demand created by residential units designed to be
occupied full time from those intended to be occupied part time (vacation
homes). For example the Report provides:
"Once a residence has been constructed it must be operated and
maintained. Some people do much of the operational and maintenance activities
themselves. while others do not. The residential survey conducted by RRC,
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Associates, Incorporated, found that the average number of full time equivalent
employees (FTE) per residential unit in Destin was 0.0854. With an estimated
86,539 dwelling units for Okaloosa County in 2006, total operational and
maintenance employment would be 7,390. This is l 77 person-hours per
residence per year devoted to operations and maintenance by employed persons."
The Ordinance imposes an obligation on developers to provide
"affordable workforce housing units" which are defined as "a dwelling unit
which is provided for a person employed in the City of Destin and their families,
either through sale or rent, at prices that are restricted to ensure the unit is
maintained as affordable to persons employed in the City." The draft ordinance 29
innovatively gives the developer several choices in regard to fulfillment of the
workforce housing obligation.
The choices, subject to approval by the City in a Workforce Housing
Mitigation Plan entered into by it and the developer are as follow:
1. To build the requisite number of workforce housing tmits on site or off site. If
the developer choses this option then the units must be deed restricted when
sold so as to maintain their character as affordable units.
2. Developer can convert the requisite number of free market housing units to
workforce/affordable units. As with the case of the construction of workforce
units restrictions are imposed designed to "keep' the units affordable.
3. Developer can contract with nonprofit organizations (a good example would
be the Habitat for Humanity) to provide · the workforce units on the
developer's behalf and
4. The developer can pay an in lieu fee (similar to an impact fee) into the City's
Affordable Workforce Housing Trust Account. The amount of the fee would
be detenn ined as the cost of building the requisite number of workforce units
and the money paid to the City must be spent for the construction or
conversion of affordable housing units.
5. The developer, with the City's approval may convey land to the City which it
can use as the site for construction for workforce housing or sell and transfer
the proceeds to the Trust Account.
The developer, with the City's permission may also combine two or
more of these methods. The purpose of providing for so many options is not only
29

City of Destin Florida, Draft Ordinance on Affordable Workforce Housing Mitigation (2007).
The author of this article was a consultant to the City in regard to the preparation of the report
and the drafting of the Ordinance.
Revis/Cl cle Dere:dw Urlx111is1ko •' A1i~tlio Ambiente
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to give considerable flexibility to the developer but to enhance the potential
judicial view of the reasonableness of the Program.

III.

Land Value capture as a source of funding for affordable housing in
Spain

An important source of revenue for affordable housing in many Spanish
regions is land value capture:
"Value capture refers to the recovery by the public of the land value increments
(unearned income ... ) generated by the actions other than the landowner's direct
investments ... . Although all such increments are essentially unearned income,
value capture policies focus primarily on the increment generated by public
investments and administrative actions, such as granting pennission for the
development of specific land uses and densities. The objective is to draw on
publicly generated land value increments to enable local administrations to
improve the performance of land use management and to fund urban
infrastructure and service provisions. The notion is that benefits provided by
governments to private landowners should be shared fa irly among all
residents. " 30
The use of land value capture in Spain in general and in Catalonia in
particular is complicated and a detailed discussion of it is definitely beyond the
possible scope of this article. It is examined in detail in the inclusionary housing
context in a book chapter written by Professor Nrco Calavita and others. 3 1
Before giving an overview of the use of land value recapture to finance
affordable housing, Calavita emphasizes the need to consider the somewhat
30

Martim Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban
Development 8 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013).
" In Spain, municipalities capnue part of the value increase in urban extension areas by requiring
landowners to cede between 5 and 15 percent of the serviced building plots to the municipality.
In addition, lando~ners must provide the land needed for infrastructure, pay the related costs for
service provision, and pay the overhead costs and a profit margin." Smolka 14.
31
Calavita, Clusa, Mur & Wiener, Spain's Constitutional Mandates: The Right to Housing,
Land Value Recapture, and Inclusionary Housing, Chapter 7 in Calavita & Mallach,
INCLUSIONAR Y HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE
HOUSfNG, SOCLAL INCLUSION • AND LAND VALUE RECAPTURE (Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy, 2010).( The Book Chapter is hereinafter cited as CALA VITA.] Similar issues and
examples of inclusionary housing issues in Catalonia are explored in Janice Griffith,

BARCELONA, SPAIN AS A MODEL FOR THE CREATION OF INNOVATION
DISTRICTS AND SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL HOUSING WITHOUT SPATIAL
SEGREGATION at page_ in the present collection of Barcelona Sn1dy Space papers.
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unique Spanish statutory and constitutional context in which the program occurs,
starting with Spain's 1956 Planning Act.
"Departing from a tradition in which property rights were sacrosanct and
local government paid for all infrastructure costs, a drastic new approach was
devised, founded on four main principles.

Social .function of property.
The right to land ownership and
l.
development is accompanied by obligations and duties.
2.
Distributive equity. The increases in land values resulting from plan
designations for development are to be shared equally among property owners.
Discretionmy power of lmv. Urban planning is a public function
3.
expressed through the municipal (or, rarely, multijurisdictional) general plan,
which distinguishes three juridical categories of property; urbanized, urbanizing,
and nondevelopable, each with its own rights and duties.
Juridical security of administrative acts. Arbitrary acts by the public
4.
sector are limited, and future land values are ensured through the systematic
assignation of uses, values, rights, and duties. In exchange, property owners are
responsible for the urban infrastructure and public facilities."32
Refonns in I 975 required land owners to provide the public facilities
needed per the comprehensive plan for new developments, including parkland.
'The 1975 legislation also required a donation to the municipality of
land equivalent in value to I 0 percent of the profit from the development. This
requirement was increased to 15 percent in 1990, butreflecting the shift from a
socialist to a conservative government, returned to I 0 percent in 1996. The
donation can be seen as a betterment tax on the benefits of urban development." 33
In regard to current Spanish constitutional provisions relevant to the use
of land value caprure and related techniques as the source of funding for
affordable housing, the two most important are Sections 33 and 47. The former
which adopts the social function theory of ownership which subjects land owners
to responsibilities as well as rights and subjects land ownership to obligations to
serve a social and not j ust a private role.

32
Calavita 241. For brief description of the Spanish land use law framework, see CNC:
Comision Nacional de la Competencia, "Competition Problems in the Spanish Land Market:
Discussion Paper," (30 July 20 13).
33
Calavita 242.
R c,·ista de De1•ed10 Urbm1i~·tfr:o l' Medio Amblt1111e
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"Section 33 I. The right to private property and inheritance is
recognized. 2. The social function of these rights shall determine the limits of
their content in accordance with the law. 3. No one may be deprived of his or her
property and rights, except on justified grounds of public utility or social interest
and with a proper compensation in accordance with the law."
The second is Section 4 7
"Section 47. All Spaniards have the right to enjoy decent and adequate
housing. The public authorities shall promote the necessary conditions and
establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, regulating
land use in accordance with the general interest in order to prevent speculation.
The community shall have a share in the benefits accruing from the townplanning policies of public bodies."
Although the relevant laws have undergone changes in recent years and
34
differ in the different autonomous regions of Spain, the process by which land
value capture provides land or funds for affordable housing can be summarized
as follows. 35 The burdens placed on the landowners are compensation to the
public for the (private) benefits they realize after doing an urban transfom1ation
operations, such as the ability to build and sell houses, etc. So, the Public
Administration allows a land transfonnation that increases the wealth of the land
owner through the Planning Gain, 36 "aprovechamiento urbanistico", which
obligates the land owner to give something back to the public interest.
That obligation includes:

1.- Obligation for the land owner to deliver for free to the Public
Administration the land for urban endowments/public utilities, and
2.- Obligation for the land owner to assign for free a percentage of
the Planning Gain to the Public Administration. 37
34

The minimum parameters are set by the State (currently by the Royal Legislative Decree
2/2008 of20 June, approving the Land Act).
35
The author is deeply indebted to Rafael Fern andez Bautista for the explanation that follows.
Any inaccuracies must be attributed to me.
36
PJanning Gain, is calculated based on the Floor Area Ratio, uses and intensity of uses allowed
on the land. Planning Gain capture applies to different kind of uses (commercial, industrial,
residential).
37
The State (within the above mentioned Royal Legislative Decree 2/2008 of20 June,
approving the Land Act), establishes that the assignation of the Pla1111ing Gain that each
Autonomous Conununity has to obligate (through its specific legislation) to the land owner, to

142

Re ,·iJtu tlr Dt ~cho Urlnmlsth·o l' Alttllo Ambleme
ISSN 11 39-4978. numbcr ~97 BIS. Modrid, Ap.r il-Ma y (20 1$). p>gcs 131· 1H

Developer fuflding of affordable and •·ork[orce liouslflf{ tltrougll impact fees aml la11d value...

In the case of Catalonia, the Legislative Decree 1/20 I 0 of 3 August, of
Urbanism, states that Urban-land-owners of not fully developed land have to
deliver for free I 0% of the Planning Gain and the owners of developable land
have to deliver for free a percentage that soars to 15%. Finally, this Planning
Gain can be delivered (i) in kind (plot of land suitable to fit the percentage given)
or, in some cases (but it is restrictive), (ii) in cash (amount equivalent to the
value of the land that would be given).
The Public Administration destines the land based on this percentage of
the Planning Gain given (or its monetization) to the Public Land and Housing
Heritage. The purposes of the Public Land and Housing Heritage are according
to Section 160.5 of the Legislative Decree 1/2010 of3 August, of Urbanism of
Catalonia: (a) to anticipate expanding populations and improving their quality of
life. (b) to create affordable housing, (c) to intervene in the housing market to
lower prices, and (d) to create reserves of tmdeveloped land.
IV.

Comparison and E"aluation of American and Spanish Approaches

At first blush it would appear that American impact fees and Spanish
value recapture programs proceed from very different approaches to developer
funding requirements. Impact fees are based on the theory that new development
and not existing residents should bear the cost of providing new infrastructure.
The Spanish land value capture approach addresses the much discussed but
seldom implemented, in the US, idea of using windfalls 38 landowners receive
from obtaining development pennission to mitigate the wipeouts suffered by
landowners negatively affected by new development or the denial of
development pennission or negative consequences suffered by society in general.
There has been much emphasis in the U.S in recent years on programs designed
to compensate landowners negatively affected by land use controls but virtually
no attention has been paid to the question of capturing for the public any portion
of the gains conferred on landowners by virtue of public improvements and
government regulations. Those few who have considered the equity - or lack
thereof - involved in granting windfalls but not compensating for wipeouts often
cite the writings of Henry George's classic work Progress and Poverty and the
late 20°' century publications of one of America 's best known land use control

give for free to the Public Administration, has to be between 5% and 15% like a general rule
(sometimes it is possible to reduce/increase this percentage).
38
The American concept of windfalls bears close resemblance to the British concept of
"betterment." See English Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Uthwatt
Committee), Final Report. Cmd. No. 6386 (1942).
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law scholars, Donald Hagman. In 1978 Professor Hagman and Dean Misczynski
published through the American Planning Association a collection of essays
titled Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation. 39
Professor Hagman was more concerned with using windfall recapture as a source
of wipeout mitigation than he was with using value recapture to fund public
projects but he nonetheless noted that under such a program the community is
only asking for a return of a portion of the wealth it creates.
It is interesting to note as a leading authority on Land Value Capture
describes U.S. impact fees as a land value capture approach.40 So perhaps the
Spanish and the U.S. approach are not that different in theory or result.
However, whatever the philosophical relationship of the two, current American
impact fee practice seems considerably more flexible. Although conceptually
Spain could designate value recapture for purposes other than affordable
housing, its current confinement to that purpose requires other ways of paying
for roads, parks, schools, libraries, public buildings, public safety facilities, etc.
Although in Spain the developer has to pay and deliver to the administration all
the development works and the infrastructure that connect with the general
services. Also collection of impact fees is not confined to major development
projects since it is collected as a precondition for building permit issuance and
can therefore be collected for the constrnction of a single dwelling or commercial
unit as well as when there is redevelopment. Although the value capture
approach is flexible in the sense that there ma·y be an arbitrary percentage of
planning gain -- 5 %, 10%, etc., the impact fee must be precisely proportionate
to the cost of providing infrastructure for new development and the money
collected must be spent in a way to benefit those who pay the fees and not j ust to
provide a general benefit to the public. Of course the serious negative to the
American approach in the affordable housing context is that relatively few
jurisdictions have thus far recognized that impact fees can be used to raise funds
for affordable or work force housing. From that standpoint the Spanish value
recapture approach and the certainty of its legality has a definitive edge.

39
Hagman & Misczynski, Windfalls For Wipeows: Land Value Capture and Compe11satio11
(1978). A summary of their principal points can be found at Juergensmeyer & Roberts,, LAND
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 81-89 (3d ed. 2012).
40
Martim Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban
Development 14 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 201 3).
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